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Civil Rights: Persons Infected with HV: Stewart
B. McKinney Foundation v. Town Plan & Zoning
Commission: Forcing the AIDS Community To Live
a Prophylactic Existence
Introduction
People with the Human Immuno-deficiency Virus (NIV) are rapidly becoming
one of the most recent casualties of this nation's perpetual battle to rise above
invidious discrimination by overcoming a wide spectrum of irrational prejudices
and self-serving community ordinances. Discrimination against persons infected
with HIV or persons infected with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
comes in many forms. Landlords refuse to make repairs to residences of NIV-
positive people, utility services are shut off, neighbors harass those whom they
suspect have HIV or AIDS, property owners attempt to evict people with HIV, and
real estate agents steer prospective home buyers away from homes in which people
with HIV have previously resided.' In addition, group homes for HIV-positive
people may be excluded by local zoning ordinances or restricted to undesirable
areas of the community. Some ordinances even go so far as to prevent people with
AIDS from living together.2
Substantial evidence indicates that people with AIDS or HIV are often subjected
to irrational discrimination in their attempts to obtain and maintain private
housing. HIV-positive persons often may not recognize discrimination or realize
they have any legal recourse for such discrimination." If the discrimination is
evident and they know they may file a complaint, many choose not to do so.5
Public policy should address these problems and encourage people infected with
NV or at risk of infection to come forward for care and education without fear of
being subjected to discrimination.6 The struggle to establish such a public policy
is necessary to preserve "our society's adherence to the principle of justice and
equality."7
1. See AIDS PRACTICE MANUAL 12-2 (Paul Albert et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992).
2. See HARTON L. DALTON & SCOTT BURRIS, AIDS AND THE LAW 142 (1987).
3. See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. H4601 (daily ed. June 22, 1988) (statement of Rep. Weiss).
4. See AIDS PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 1, at 12-2.
5. See id.; NATIONAL AIDS PROJECT, AM. CIL LIBERTIES UNION, EPIDEMIC OF FEAR: A SURVEY
OF AIDS DISCRIMINATION IN THE 1980S AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 1990s, at 29-29
(1990).
6. Id. at 119; see also Board of Trustees, Am. Medical Ass'n, Prevention and Control of AIDS, 258
JAMA 2097, 2102 (1987) [hereinafter AMA Board of Trustees].
7. Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health Strategies for Confronting AIDS, 261 JAMA 1621, 1628
(1989); see, e.g., PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS, REPORT at 120
(1988); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NAIL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONFRONTING AIDS: DIRECTIONS FOR
PUBLIC HEALTH, HEALTH CARE, AND RESEARCH 19 (1986); AMA Board of Trustees, supra note 6, at
2101-02.
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In Stewart B. McKinney Foundation v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission,8 the
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut clearly established that
in the absence of a legitimate zoning concern, a municipality cannot require
individuals with IIIV to apply for a special use permit? An application such as
this would subject HIV-positive individuals to unwarranted public scrutiny.
Requiring HIV-infected persons who desire to live in a residential community to
satisfy requirements which are not required of noninfected persons perpetuates
segregation and discrimination.'0
This comment will address the problems encountered by people with HIV or
AIDS in the area of zoning. Part I of this comment will offer a brief history of
zoning discrimination in America. Part II will analyze the newest target of zoning
discrimination - HIV-positive persons. This comment will also look to the future
in determining the effect of the McKinney opinion in combatting continued
discrimination against people with HIV-related infections. Finally, this comment
will propose HIV-specific legislation recognizing HIV as a handicap. The primary
focus of the proposed legislation will facilitate community acceptance of group
homes for the treatment of persons infected with HIV.
L History of Zoning Discrimination
Housing discrimination in the United States has existed since the founding of
our nation. A glance at history reveals that residential and ethnic segregation and
other forms of discrimination remain pervasive in the United States." Housing
discrimination was established by deliberate government policies, fueled by the
racially discriminatory operation of private financing and real estate markets. 2
Racial segregation and discrimination in zoning bolsters segregation and
discrimination in other areas, such as education, employment, health care, and
virtually every aspect of today's society.
8. 790 F. Supp. 1197 (D. Conn. 1992).
9. Id. at 1219.
10. Id. at 1220.
11. See EDWARD B. LAZERE & PAUL A. LEONARD, THE CRISIS IN HOUSING FOR THE POOR: A
SPECIAL REPORT ON HISPANICS AND BLACKS (Center on Budget & Policy Priorities, 1989); Douglas S.
Massey & Nancy A. Denton, Hypersegregation in U.S. Metropolitan Areas: Black and Hispanic
Segregation Along Five Dimensions, 26 DEMOGRAPHY 373 (1989).
12. Karl Taeuber, The Contemporary Context of Housing Discrimination, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
339. 340 (1988); Leonard S. Rubinowitz & Elizabeth Trosman, Affirmative Action and the American
Dream: Implementing Fair Housing Policies in Federal Homeownership Programs, 74 Nw. U. L. REV.
491 (1979); James A. Kushner, Apartheid in America: An Historical and Legal Analysis of Contempo.
rary Racial Residential Segregation in the United States, 22 How. L.J. 547 (1979). The conclusions of
the Kerner Commission in 1968 are valid today: "White society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White
institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it." KERNER COMM'N,
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 2 (Bantam Books 1968)
[hereinafter KERNER COMM'N REPORT].
13. Professor Douglas Massey has said:
Where you live determines the chances you get in this world. It determines the school




Congress sought to prohibit discrimination in housing on the basis of race, color,
national origin, religion, and sex by enacting Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of
1968'4 and the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988."s In 1960 President John
F. Kennedy in his message to Congress called for Americans to accept the mentally
retarded into their homes and communities. 6 As late as 1975, the Supreme Court
of the United States forbade the federal government from discriminating against
people with different religious beliefs through zoning. 7
Since 1974 the Supreme Court has returned to reviewing zoning laws."8 Because
the Court has continued to give broad deference to local zoning authority, 9 the state
legislatures have sought to remedy these exclusionary methods? The challenge of
every state and community should be to break the stigma of classification and
discrimination. A court, when considering the effects of zoning ordinances on a
community, should consider the benefits total integration provides. The detriments
society once feared from desegregation may be found to be insignificant.
you're not isolated from the mainstream, it's not a fair world, it's not a fair contest.
Segregation is structural underpinning of the underclass.
Study Finds Segregation in Cities Worse Than Scientists Imagined, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1989, at 6, col.
5 (quoting Professor Douglas Massey of the University of Chicago).
14. Title VIII is commonly known as the Fair Housing Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988).
15. Pub. L. No. 100-430, §§ 800-815, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631
(1988)).
16. President John F. Kennedy, Special Message to Congress on Mental Illness and Mental
Retardation (Feb. 5, 1963), in 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1466, 1466, quoted in Deborah A. Schmedemann,
Note, Zoning for the Mentally Ill: A Legislative Mandate, 16 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 853, 853 (1979).
Moreover, "redirection of State resources from State mental institutions would achieve our goal of having
community-centered mental health services readily accessible to all." Steven A. Adler, Comment, Group
Homes and Deinstitutionalization: The Legislative Response to Exclusionary Zoning, 6 VT. L. REV. 509,
509 (1981) (quoting President Kennedy).
17. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that disqualification of Seventh-day
Adventist for unemployment compensation solely because of her refusal to accept employment, which
would have required her to work on Saturday, contrary to her religious beliefs, imposes unconstitutional
burden on free exercise of religion); see also Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown, 239 N.E.2d 891
(N.Y. 1968) (stating that setback ordinance as applied to temple found to abridge religious freedom);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding application of compulsory school attendance law to
Amish children to be violative of Free Exercise Clause); cf. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1983) (holding
that the government may not compel religious observances, but individuals may not demand that the
government join in their religious practice).
18. See Shad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (invalidating a zoning ordinance
that prohibited live nude dancing in the community); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)
(holding that a zoning ordinance that prohibited a grandmother from living with her grandson defined
family too narrowly in violation of the due process clause); Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S.
50 (1976) (upholding a zoning ordinance that dispersed adult theaters throughout the community); Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding a zoning ordinance that prohibited more than two
unrelated or unmarried persons from living in the same dwelling).
19. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); South
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
20. See ARDEN H. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING & PLANNING § 17A, at 29 (4th ed. 1985)
(finding that state agencies can preempt local control by having state agencies operate the group homes
or by funding private group home operaters).
1993]
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II. The Fair Housing Act
Discrimination in housing and the pervasiveness of restrictive covenants
contributed to urban unrest in the 1960's."' Recognition of arbitrary treatment of
particular groups led to the enactment of legislation prohibiting discrimination. Title
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,' commonly called the Fair Housing Act, was
designed to eliminate all discrimination in housing.' Despite the best efforts of
Congress, the Fair Housing Act lacked an effective enforcement mechanism.u
Congress left the enforcement of the Fair Housing Act with private persons and fair
housing organizations.' Although some success was achieved, the effort was
limited by the financial resources of the litigants and the bar.' Although the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) also investigates housing
discrimination complaints, it can only use "informal methods of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion" in an attempt to battle this discrimination."
In 1988 Congre3s passed the Fair Housing Amendments Act (the Act)' which
created an admini;trative enforcement mechanism. The Act grants HIV-infected
persons the opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling under the protection of federal
authority." However, this right to freely associate in any residential community is
not absolute. It is subject to the "direct threat" provision of the Act.3 According
to the Act, a court would need to evaluate whether a "direct threat" and a
"significant risk" of harm exists to individuals in the community and/or the
immediate surroundings before the legislation will be upheld.3
21. See, e.g., KERnER COMM'N REPORT, supra note 12.
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988).
23. Id. The Act stites that "[ilt is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional
limitations, for fair houing throughout the United States." Id. Handicapped persons have been protected
from some forms of discrimination since Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §
794 (1988), and the same definitions and concepts from that well-established law are used in the Fair
Housing Act.
24. Fair Housing Amendment Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988)). A recent study examined residential segregation in 60 metropolitan areas
and found that blacks continue to experience very high levels of segregation. In Chicago, for example,
the amount of segregation was 88% for blacks, 64% for Hispanics and 44% for Asians. Testimony of
Professor Douglas S. Massey, University of Chicago, Issues Relating to Fair Housing, Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development of the House Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs Comm., 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988).
25. See H.R. REP. No. 711. 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, 22 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2173, 2177, 2183.
26. Id. Attorney fees may be available to the prevailing party in a Title VIII case pursuant to the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1988, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1988).
28. Pub. L. No. 1CO-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988)).
29. Id.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 3(04(f)(9) (Supp. III 1991) (defining a "direct threat" as "a significant risk to the
health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation").




The Act, therefore, enables the federal government to take an active role in
enforcing the law.32 HUD continues to investigate housing discrimination
complaints and reconciles the conflicts between the parties.3 However, if both
parties fail to agree, and after determination of whether reasonable cause exists,
HUD can order an administrative hearing?' HUD can continue to enforce the law
creating an incentive for both parties to resolve the complaint in the early stages.35
This incentive is further strengthened by expanding the statute of limitations,
removing the restriction on punitive damages, and providing fee-shifting language
similar to other civil rights statutes in Title VIII.
Another significant change in the Fair Housing Amendment Act of 1988 was the
inclusion of handicapped persons as a protected class?7 There is little question that
BIV-infected persons are considered "handicapped" within the meaning of the Fair
Housing Act? The legislative history of the amended Act indicates Congress'
intent to include AIDS sufferers within the class of protected persons.3 9 A report
32. Id. at 17, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2178.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 13. reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2174.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 16, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2177. Unlike other civil rights laws, attorneys fees
are available to a prevailing plaintiff only if the plaintiff cannot afford to pay. However, under the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Act the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party attorney fees' as
part of the costs in proceedings in vindication of civil rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988). An individual with handicaps is defined as "any person who
(i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major
life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment."
Id. § 3602(h); see also 134 CONG. REc. H4921 (daily ed. June 29, 1988) (statement of Rep. WVaxman);
134 CONG. REC. S10,464 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1988) (statement of Sen. Harkin); H.R. REP. No. 711, supra
note 25, at 22 n.55, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2183 ("AIDS and infection with the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) are covered under this Act .... ."). "This language is substantially similar
to the definition under the primary federal law prohibiting discrimination against the handicapped, the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The Committee intends that the definition be interpreted consistent with
regulations clarifying the meaning of the similar provision found in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act." Id. at 22, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2183; see, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 84.30) (1992) (defining
an individual with handicaps as "any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an
impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment"); 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A, subpart A
(1992). As the regulations note, the definition of handicap does not include a list of specific diseases and
conditions that constitute physical or mental impairments because of the difficulty of ensuring the
comprehensiveness of any such list and because some conditions covered under the definition of
handicap may not even have been discovered or prevalent in the population at the time of passage of
legislation. For example, AIDS and infection with HIV are covered under this Act, although such
conditions were not even discovered when section 504 was passed in 1973. See, e.g., Local 1812, Am.
Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. U.S. Dep't of State, 662 F. Supp. 50, 54 (D.D.C. 1987); Ray v. School Dist.
of DeSoto County, 666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
38. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.201(a)(2) (1991) (stating that regulations developed by HUD to implement
the FHA Act explicitly confirm its coverage of HIV-infected persons); see also Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972) (stating that because Congress gave HUD the
authority to administer the Fair Housing Act, HUD's opinion is given great weight when interpreting the
law).
39. See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. H4612 (daily ed. June 29, 1988) (statement of Rep. Schroeder); 134
19931
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of the House Judiciary Committee flatly stated that "AIDS and infection with the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) are covered under this Act . . ..
However, although the Fair Housing Act prohibits discrimination against handi-
capped individuals, including AIDS patients, it does not prevent a landowner from
denying housing in order to preserve the health and safety of the community.4'
This provision was added by the Committee to allay the fears of those who believe
that the nondiscriminatory provisions of the Act could force landlords and owners
to rent or sell to individuals whose tenancies could pose a risk.!' Although the
intent of Congress was to prohibit the use of stereotypes and prejudice in denying
critical housing to HIV-infected persons, Congress succeeded in fanning the flames
of prejudice that AdDS sufferers pose an immediate health risk to others. There is
absolutely no evidence supporting the conclusion that AIDS patients pose any
significant threat to the safety of a community!'
Congress' inclusion of HIV-infected persons as handicapped is a clear pronounce-
ment of a national commitment to end the unnecessary exclusion of persons with
handicaps from the American mainstream." However, the continued use of
stereotypes and public misinformation is alarming. There is uncontested medical
evidence which establishes that HIV is not readily transmittable through social
contact, insects, or with people living together' Each state must recognize the
shortcomings of the Fair Housing Act when enacting legislation to prevent housing
CONG. REc. H4922 (daily ed. June 29, 1988) (statement of Rep. Owens); 134 CONW. REc. H4921 (daily
ed. June 29, 1988) (stitement of Rep. Waxman); 134 CONG. REC. H4613 (daily ed. June 22, 1988)
(statement of Rep. Coelho); 134 CONG. REC. H4689 (daily ed. June 23, 1988) (statement of Rep. Pelosi);
134 CONG. REC. H4900 (daily ed. June 29, 1988) (statement of Rep. Bryant); 134 CONG. REc. S 10, 557
(daily ed. Aug. 2, 198F.) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
40. H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 25, at 22 n.55, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2189; see, e.g.,
134 CONG. REC. H4921 (daily ed. June 29, 1988) (statement of Rep. Waxman); 134 CONG. REC. S 10,464
(daily ed. Aug. 1, 198S,) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(9) (1988). The Act provides: "Nothing in this subsection requires that a
dwelling be made available to an individual whose tenancy would constitute a direct threat to the health
or safety of other individuals or whose tenancy would result in substantial physical damage to the
property of others." d.; see also H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 25, at 29, reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2190.
42. See H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 25, at 28, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2189. The
report also stated:
Following adoption of the substitute amendment, another amendment was offered that
would have excluded from the definition of handicap 'any current impairment that consists
of an infectious, contagious or communicable disease whether or not such disease causes
a physical or mental impairment during the period of contagion.' The debate on this
amendment primarily centered around people infected with HIV (and the AIDS virus).
The amendment was defeated.
Id. at 28 n.72, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2189.
43. See Association of Relatives & Friends of AIDS Patients (AFAPS) v. Regulations & Permits
Admin., 740 F. Supp. 95, 103 (D.P.R. 1990) (stating that "the uncontested scientific and medical
evidence establishes that HIV is not readily transmittable through food, mosquitoes or casual contact, and
that the presence of the hospice poses no risk to the community at large").
44. See H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 25, at 18, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2179.




discrimination. Until HIV-specific language is included in all proposed legislation,
persons infected with HIV will have little recourse against discrimination.
III. The "Newest" Target of Zoning Discrimination - HIV-Positive Persons
A. What Is HIV?
HIV is a virus that damages the human immune system and results in an ongoing
disease which frequently leads to grave infections and malignancies. Most Hrv-
related infections are "opportunistic infections" that take advantage of the weakened
immune system, although some diseases are caused directly by the virus itself!7
HIV is spread when the virus from one person makes contact with the blood
stream or bodily fluids of another.48 The three basic modes of transmission are: (1)
by contact with infected blood; (2) through unprotected sex with an infected person;
and (3) from an infected mother to a fetus or newborn.49
As of January 1992, 209,693 cases meeting the definition of AIDS had been
reported in the United States and its territories and 135,434 deaths had resulted."
However, it has been estimated that over one million people in the United States are
infected with HIV. There will have been from 390,000 to 480,000 cumulative
cases of AIDS by the end of 1993; two-thirds of which will have resulted in death.'
46. See AIDS PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 1, at 2-4. Earlier acronyms for HIV included HTLV-
III (human T-cell lymphotropic virus type 3) and LAV (lymphadenopathy-associated virus). A second
strain of HIV has been identified which is common in parts of West Africa. although virtually unreported
in the U.S. This strain is identified as "HIV-2." The strain most common throughout the would is
designated "HIV-1," although in much of the medical literature and in nonmedical circles it is referred
to as "HIV." Martin E. Levy, Human Immunodeficiency Viruses and the Pathogenesis of AIDS, 261
JAMA 2997, 3003 (1989).
47. AIDS PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 1. at 2-4.
48. Id.
49. Id.; see also Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-Care Settings, 36
[No. 2S] CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL: MMWR (MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.) at 2S
(Supp. 1987); [hereinafter Recommendations for Prevention].
50. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. PUBLIC HEATH SERV., HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT
8 (1992) [hereinafter CDC SURVEILLANCE REPORT]. The CDC surveillance report is the authoritative
source for the number of AIDS cases, shown by "risk group," gender, race/ethnic group, and geography.
There is evidence of underreporting of AIDS, however. See Edward 0. Laumann et al., Monitoring the
AIDS Epidemic in the United States: A Network Approach, 244 SCIENCE 1186 (1989) (suggesting that
CDC undercounted the prevalence of AIDS among whites in higher socioeconomic classes and over
estimated the prevalence in minority populations). But see George A. Conway et al., Underreporting of
AIDS Cases in South Carolina, 1986 and 1987, 262 JAMA 2859 (1989) (finding significantly poorer
reporting among blacks than whites and among women).
51. HIV Prevalence, Projected AIDS Case Estimates: Workshop, Oct. 31-Nov. 1, 1989,39 CENTERS
FOR DtsEAsE CONTROL: MMWR (MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP.) 110, 111 (1990) [hereinafter
AIDS Case Estimates]. Estimates of the extent of infection (semprevalence) in the United States are
controversial. Figures have ranged from 750,000 to 2.5 million. For discussion of issues involved in
monitoring seroprevalence and AIDS, see AIDS: SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND INTRAVENOUS DRUG USE 31-
72, 447-70 (Charles F. Turner et al. eds., 1989); AIDS: THE SECOND DECADE 359-471 (Heather G.
Miller et al. eds., 1990).
52. See AIDS Case Estimates, supra note 51, at 117. In 1991, 182,834 AIDS cases and 115,984
1993]
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The extreme unlikelihood of casual transmission is confirmed by the history of
the epidemic. 3 Even when living in close contact in hygienic environments, family
members of people with AIDS do not acquire HIV except through the usual routes:
unprotected intercourse, contact with contaminated blood, and transmission from
mother to fetus.' Not one case of HIV transmission through air, tears, sweat, or
urine has been reported.' There is no danger of contracting the virus from
common activities such as donating blood, shaking hands, hugging, social kissing,
sharing swimming pools, touching toilet seats or telephones, massages, eating in
restaurants or using the same drinking glasses or food utensils, sharing towels,
sharing bed linens, or from any other form of everyday contact.56 All evidence
indicates that being bitten by mosquitoes or other insects or animals poses no
deaths had been reported in the United States. CDC HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT 1-18 (July 1991).
The World Health Organization (WHO) has estimated that eight million to ten million people were
infected with HIV worldwide as of July 1990. Sharp Rise in AIDS Infection Is Reported in Third World,
N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 2, 1990, at 18. The WHO predicts that between 25 million and 30 million people
worldwide will be infect.ed by the year 2000, of whom one-third will be children. Children's AIDS Cases
Are Reported To Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1990, at 7; see also AIDS PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note
1, at 2-6.
53. See Robert J. Lifson, Do Alternative Modes for Transmission of HIV Exist?, 259 JAMA 1353
(1989) (stating that HIr is not spread by causal contact and is not contagious in the popular sense of
being easy to transmit); A.A. Gershon et al., The Risk of Transmission of HIV-I Through Non-
percutaneous, Non-sexual Modes: A Review, 4 AIDS 645 (1990) (stating that unlike influenza,
tuberculosis, and the common cold, HIV is not spread in the air by droplet infection, nor is spread by
surface-to-skin or skin-to-skin contact, but is in fact a fragile virus outside the body); Recommendations
for Prevention, supra note 49, at 2S (stating that the HIV infection is killed by heating and ordinary
disinfectants, such as rubbing alcohol, hydrogen peroxide, chlorine bleach, and probably ordinary soaps).
54. Margaret A. Fishl et al., Evaluation of Heterosexual Partners, Children, and Household Contacts
ofAdults with AIDS. 257 JAMA 640,642 (1987); see Ray v. School Dist., 666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Fla.
1987). In holding that a student with AIDS must be readmitted to school, the court in Ray stated:
Extensive and numerous studies consistently have found no apparent risk of HIV infection
by individuals exposed through close, non-sexual contact with AIDS patients. These
studies have demionstrated that contacts involving sharing of household items, such as
toothbrushes, eating utensils, and baths or toilets, do not lead to HIV-infection. Similarly,
there is no evidence that close personal, but non-sexual interaction, such as giving a bath,
shaking hands or kissing on the lips, will cause HIV-infection.
Id. at 1530-31.
55. See AIDS PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 1, at 2-12, 2-13.
56. See Martha F. Rogers et al., Lack of Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency virus from
Infected Children to Their Household Contacts, 85 PEDIATRICS 210 (1990). The CDC introduced
recommendations with the following paragraph:
Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), the virus that causes acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome (AIDS), is transmitted through sexual contact and exposure to infected blood
or blood componsnts and perinatally from mother to neonate. HIV has been isolated from
blood, semen, vaginal secretions, saliva. tears, breast milk, cerebrospinal fluid, amniotic
fluid, and urine and is likely to be isolated from other body fluids, secretions, and
excretions. However, epidemiologic evidence has implicated only blood, semen, vaginal
secretions, and possibly breast milk in transmission.
Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-Care Settings, 36 [No. 2S] MMWR




threat." Even human biting, an invasive contact between individuals, has not
resulted in any documented cases of transmission.58
Because of the debilitating effects of HIV, a patient in the terminal stage of AIDS
is typically better off in a hospice situation than in a hospital because his immune
system is not capable of fighting off intra-hospital acquired infections 9 Hospice
care is also considerably less expensive than hospital treatment, which for an AIDS
patient can be as much as $1,000 per day.'
B. Case Law Prior to McKinney •
Three cases illustrate the varying approaches courts have used to build public
awareness of HIV as a handicap under the purview of the Fair Housing Amendment
Act. In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline," the United States Supreme
Court decided whether a person with a contagious disease is considered "handi-
capped" under Section 504 of the Federal Rehabilitation Act.' Since Section 504
applies only to federal programs or activities receiving financial assistance in
employment, the Federal Housing Amendment Act later adopted the same three-part
definition of "handicap" to prohibit discrimination in housing.'
Arline involved a school teacher who was terminated because of persistent
tuberculosis. The disease posed a threat to the health of others. The school board
argued that the teacher's illness distinguished her from handicapped persons
protected under the Federal Rehabilitation Act.' The majority in Arline disagreed
57. See Lifson, supra note 53.
58. In one study of 30 health care workers bitten and/or scratched by a patient with AIDS, not one
seroconverted. At least three of the bites involved breaking of skin. Chris M. Tsoukas et al., Lack of
Transmission of HIV Through Human Bites and Scratches, 1 AIDS 505 (1988); see also Rennie
Drummond, Seronegative 18 Months After Being Bitten by a Patient with AIDS, 256 JAMA 2342 (1986).
59. See Association of Relatives & Friends of AIDS Patients (AFAPS) v. Regulations & Permits
Admin., 740 F. Supp. 95, 101 (D.P.R. 1990) (testimony of Dr. Rivera and Dr. Garib). The doctors'
testimony went completely unchallenged by the defendants.
60. Id.; see also Diane E. Felix et al., AIDS in the Long-Term Care Setting, 7 ST. LouIs U. PuB.
L. REV. 115 (1988) ("[Als median survival time after an AIDS diagnosis lengthens with the advent of
new therapeutic agents and better care, many more persons with AIDS will suffer care in long-term,
residential institutions."), quoted in AIDS PRACrICE MANUAL, supra note 1, at 11-14.
61. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
62. Arline, 480 U.S. at 273; see also 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988 & Supp. H 1990) (defining an
"individual with handicaps" as "any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an
impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment").
63. See AIDS PRAcrCE MANUAL, supra note 1, at 12-6. The Fair Housing Act adopts essentially
the same three-part definition of "handicap" as that used in Section 504 of the Federal Rehabilitation Act.
Legislative history indicates that "handicap" under the FHA Act should be interpreted in the same way
as under Section 504 of the FRA. Given such intent, and given that Section 504 has been construed to
cover HIV-infected persons, it is clear that the Fair Housing Act also applies to those persons. See H.R.
REP. No. 711, supra note 25, at 17, 22, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2178, 2183.
64. The school board asserted that a person with tuberculosis is not "handicapped" because
tuberculosis does not constitute a "physical impairment" which limits one or more "major life activities,"
which is a requirement of § 504 of the Federal Rehabilitation Act.
1993]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1993
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
and stated that excluding persons with contagious diseases would be inconsistent
with congressional intent."'
Arline did not specifically address whether a carrier of a contagious disease
such as AIDS could be considered to have a physical impairment, or whether
contagiousness alone is sufficient to warrant protection under the Federal
Rehabilitation Act.' The decision did, however, uphold the statutory definition
that any person is "handicapped" if the disease involves a "physical impairment"
which limits one or more "major life activities."67 This seemingly neutral judicial
response sends an enlightening message of hope to those who maintain that AIDS
limits a major life. activity and deserves protection. Since Arline, other courts
have held that HIV infection and/or AIDS satisfies one or more of the "prongs"
of the statutory definition of handicap.68 In particular, where HIV impairs the
hemic (blood) and lymphatic or reproductive systems, 69 the individual is
considered handicapped." These handicaps allow for federal assistance in
discriminatory actions.'
Unlike the Arline case, Baxter v. City of Belleville" deals specifically with
HIV. In Baxter an individual sought and was denied a special permit to open a
residence intended to house people with AIDS. The city's zoning board denied the
permit because of the fear of the possible spread of HIV into the community. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois held that
legislative history and case law clearly indicate that HIV-positive persons are
65. Arline, 480 U.S. at 282. See supra notes 39, 40 and accompanying text.
66. Subsequent courts, however, have addressed the application of the Rehabilitation Act to persons
infected with HIV, and have found that those with AIDS and HIV are handicapped under the Act. See,
e.g., Stewart B. McKinn-y Found. v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 790 F. Supp. 1197 (D. Conn. 1992);
Association of Relative., & Friends of AIDS Patients (AFAPS) v. Regulations & Permits Admin., 740
F. Supp. 95 (D.P.R. 19SO); Baxter v. Cihy of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720 (S.D. Iil. 1989).
67. Arline, 480 U.S. at 281.
68. See. e.g., Doe v. Dolton Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1988);
Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that first prong
of the three-part test wa3 satisfied, i.e., HIV is a physical impairment which substantially limits one or
more "major life activities"); Doe v. Centinela Hosp., 57 U.S.L.W. 2034 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 1988);
District 27 Community 3ch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Queens County Sup. Ct. 1986)
(holding HIV satisfies third prong of the test).
69. See AIDS PRA.''na MANUAL, supra note 1, at 12-4 ("since an HIV-positive person probably
cannot engage in reproductive activity without endangering the lives of the offspring and the other
parent").
70. See, e.g., Doe, 694 F. Supp. at 444; District 27 Community Sch. Bd., 502 N.Y.S,2d at 336.
71. See H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 25. at 13, 17, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2174,2178.
The report stated that the amendment to the Fair Housing Act seeks to provide an effective administrative
enforcement system, subject to judicial review, by moving barriers to the use of court enforcement by
private litigants and the Department of Justice. Id Second, the amendment extends the principle of equal
housing opportunity to handicapped persons, including AIDS sufferers. Id. Third, the amendment extends
protection to families with children. ld. Both handicapped persons and families with children, like the
other classes protected by title VIII, have been the victims of unfair and discriminatory housing practices.
Id.




protected under the Fair Housing Act.73 Moreover, the Baxter decision brought
to light the zoning commission's unwarranted fears, labeling them as a contribut-
ing cause of the public's hysteria surrounding the issue of AIDS. This hysteria
prevents people with HIV from interacting with non-HIV-infected people,
adversely affecting a "major life activity" in violation of the Fair Housing Act.74
The fear of HIV has caused discrimination not only against those actually
infected, but also against persons perceived to be members of high-risk groups."'
An example of this hysteria can be found in Association of Relatives & Friends
of AIDS Patients (AFAPS) v. Regulations & Permits Administration.76
In AFAPS, a special interest group sought a special use permit to open an AIDS
hospice "to comfort patients in the final stages of the [HIV] disease."' Outraged
community residents strongly opposed the hospice, fearing that the AIDS virus
might spread throughout the community. The community's fears ranged from
contracting the virus through mosquito bites to the possibility that the hospice
residents might pose a danger to students attending a nearby school.
Using current medical opinions, the district court in AFAPS rejected the
resident's concerns as baseless and enjoined the agency from denying the issuance
of the special use permit.78 Relying on Baxter, the court noted "there is little
question that persons terminally ill with AIDS are considered handicapped within
the meaning of the Fair Housing Act"79 and specifically referred to Congress'
intent to include AIDS patients in the term "handicapped."
Both Baxter and AFAPS reflect an effort by the judiciary to develop and apply
the three-part definition of handicap adopted by the Fair Housing Act. The Fair
Housing Act includes a provision "that a dwelling be made available to an
individual whose tenancy would not constitute a direct threat to the health or
safety of other individuals or whose tenancy would not result in substantial
physical damage to the property of others."'8
The House Judiciary Committee, when considering the "direct threat"
provision, "did not foresee that the tenancy of any individual with handicaps
would pose any risk, much less a significant risk, to the health or safety of others
by the status of being handicapped .... , Under this provision, a property
73. Id. at 729.
74. Id. at 730, 735.
75. See Mary C. Dunlap, AIDS and Discrimination in the United States: Reflections on the Nature
of Prejudice in a Virus, 34 VILL. L. REv. 909, 909-17 (1989).
76. 740 F. Supp. 95 (D.P.R. 1990).
77. Id. at 98.
78. Id. at 101, 107.
79. Id. at 103.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(9) (1988).
81. See H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 25, at 28, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2189. When
the Act was amended, several members of Congress made strong statements that the tenancy of an HIV-
infected person could not cause a direct threat to the health or safety of others. See 134 CONG. REc.
H4689 (daily ed. June 23, 1988) (statement of Rep. Pelosi); 134 CONG. REC. H4613 (daily ed. June 22,
1988) (statement of Rep. Schroeder); 134 CONG. REC. H4921 (daily ed. June 29, 1988) (statement of
Rep. Waxman); see also 134 CONG. REc. S10,464 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1988) (statement of Sen. Harkin)
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owner would have to establish that there is a nexus between the fact of the
individual's tenancy and the asserted direct threat. 2 Thus, a court needs to
evaluate whether a direct threat and a significant risk of harm would exist in the
context of the individual's tenancy. 3
Considering the limited occurrences in which HIV is transmitted, the
habitability of homes in a residential neighborhood clearly does not cause a
"direct threat" or "significant risk" to the public. In Baxter, it was held that
"conclusive medical evidence" is insufficient to outweigh the harm to Baxter if
he were unable to reside in the community." Similarly, in AFAPS it was held
that "the unconte;ted scientific and medical evidence established that . . . the
presence of the hospice poses no risk to the community at large.""
Recent court decisions clearly demonstrate the Fair Housing Act's power has
to remedy incidents of discrimination towards handicapped individuals, including
persons infected with HIV." The Fair Housing Act successfully forecloses all
avenues of redress available to communities who desire to arbitrarily discriminate
against the handicapped. Arguments for exclusionary zoning are relegated to
specific findings that the health, safety, and welfare of a community are imper-
iled.' The judiciaty's terse treatment of exclusionary zoning provides encourage-
ment for HIV-infected persons who continue to fight for equality under the law.
The mere fact that zoning discrimination exists today is a vivid and ugly
reminder of society's willingness to accept the things they feel they cannot
change. From the beginning of recorded history, ethnocentricity towards different
races and ambivalence towards people with handicaps have caused inaction by
society at large, no matter how genuine or deserving the cause. Only ten states
and municipalities have adopted laws explicitly banning housing discrimination
on the basis of H][V infection. Stewart B. McKinney v. Town Plan & Zoning
Commission9 offers a real opportunity for changing the attitudes of state and
local municipalities in their treatment of all citizens they have taken an oath to
protect.
("not foreseeable that the tenancy of any individual with handicaps would pose any risk"); 134 CONG.
REc. H4613 (daily ed. Jine 22, 1988) (statement of Rep. Coehlo) ("extremely unlikely that a person with
a disability would ever pose such a direct threat").
82. See H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 25, at 29, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2190.
83. Id.
84. Baxter, 720 F. Supp. at 724-26.
85. AFAPS, 740 F. Supp. at 103.
86. Arline, 480 U.S. at 473; see also Baxter, 720 F. Supp. at 720.
87. Baxter, 720 F. Supp. at 734-35.
88. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 191.665, 213.010 (Vernon Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.50
(West Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS, § 23-6-22 (1989); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 601A.2( 1I) (West Supp.
1990); SAN FRANCISCO MUN.-POUICE CODE pt. It, ch. VIII, art. 38 (Ord. No. 499-85, passed Nov. 12,
1985); SAN DIEGO Mufl. CODE ch. V, art. 2, div. 95, §§ 52.9500; OAKLAND ORD. No. 10723 C.M.S.
(passed May 6, 1986); Los ANGELES MUN. CODE ch. IllI, §§ 45.80 (Los Angeles Ord. No. 160289,
passed Aug. 14, 1985); SANTA MONICA MUN. CODE art. IV, ch. 9C; BERKELEY ORD. No. 5712 N.S.
(passed Jan. 21, 1986); AUSTIN MUN. CODE art. VI, §§ 7-4-120 (Austin Ord. No. 86121 1-V, pt. 1).




IV. Statement of the Case
The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut was given the
opportunity to unequivocally draw judicial lines concerning HIV-infected persons
and their rights as American citizens to live in a residence of their choice.
McKinney illustrates the inherent difficulty in enforcing non-IlV specific legislation
in the housing discrimination arena. By trying to do what is right for both HIV-
infected and non-IlV-infected persons, the scales of justice slowly tip toward
equality one ounce at a time.
The Stewart B. McKinney Foundation (hereinafter the Foundation) is a nonprofit
corporation which provides housing assistance for HIV-infected persons. Due to the
serious shortages of housing in Connecticut for people with HIV, the Foundation
received inquiries from persons infected with AIDS requesting its involvement. The
defendant, Town Plan and Zoning Commission (hereinafter the Commission), is a
municipal agency whose function is to adopt, interpret, and enforce zoning
regulations.
In 1988, the Foundation purchased a two family residence located in the town of
Fairfield. The residence was to be rented to seven IlV-infected persons who were
presently homeless or threatened with homelessness. The Foundation did not intend
to provide medical services to the residents in the house. The only conditions of
tenancy were that each tenant be homeless and have lIV.
The Foundation informed the public that it had purchased a house and that it
intended to use it as a residence for homeless HIV-infected persons. After refusing
to disclose the location of the house, a town meeting was held where the neighbors
expressed fear of AIDS and made discriminatory remarks about people with HIV.
To address perceived problems, the Foundation sponsored a forum. The crowd
became hostile and out of control; shortly thereafter, citizens of Fairfield formed a
group called "Concerned Neighbors of Fairfield" to oppose the Foundation's agenda.
The attorney for the Foundation contacted the Director of the Planning and
Zoning Commission and was told the proposed use of the Fairfield property was
permitted subject to securing a special exception. The Foundation told the Director
that it would obtain a certificate of rental occupancy only upon the town waiving
the requirement of listing the occupants' names in order to protect their confidential-
ity.
The Director sent the Foundation a letter asking several questions about the
proposed residence. The questions related to the average age of the occupants, the
disposal of garbage, and the name of the record title holder to the property. The
Foundation objected to these questions as being unrelated to legitimate zoning
concerns.
The Commission offered the Foundation an alternate piece of property far away
from other residences. A town task force was organized to study this proposal, but
the dominant sentiment expressed by members of the public was one of opposition.
Subsequently, the Commission withdrew the offer. The Commission notified the
1993]
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Foundation, reiterting that its proposed use of the Fairfield property was permitted
subject to securing a special exemption."
The Commission analogized the Foundation's residence to that of a chronic and
convalescent nursing home. This classification is important in that it would require
the Foundation to be licensed under the state public health code's chronic and
convalescent nursing home provisions. The Foundation adamantly argued against
this classification and sought a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants from
requiring a special exemption or otherwise taking any zoning enforcement action
against the tenants for failure to obtain the special exemption.
V. Analysis of the McKinney Decision
The McKinney court adopted a two part test for establishing a violation of the
Fair Housing Act developed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation." The first
part of the Arlington Heights test requires a showing of discriminatory intent.'
However, the discriminatory intent need not be the sole factor." The second part
is the "disparate impact" analysis, which examines whether the effect of the
defendant's action is unnecessarily discriminatory absent any intent to discrimi-
nate.' The McKinney court determined that the actions of the Commission
violated the plaintiffs rights under the Fair Housing Act9 First, the court found
that the Commission's claim that its actions were to further consistent zoning was
fraudulent.' Therefore the HIV-positive status of the Foundation's future tenants
was at least a partial motivating factor in the Commission's decision. 7 Second, the
court determined that requiring HIV-infected persons to satisfy requirements which
are not required of noninfected persons perpetuates the segregation of the
handicapped." Finally, the court concluded that the town's concern about
90. Special uses are permitted subject to certain conditions specified in the zoning regulations. If
the appropriate administrative agency determines that the conditions have been met, a use will be
permitted. See 3 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 19.01 (2d ed. 1976).
91. See Stewart B. McKinney v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 790 F. Supp. 1197, 1211 (1992)
(citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)) (Arlington
Heights ); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978) (Arlington Heights I1)). Other courts have since adopted this
analysis. See, e.g., Baxter v. Town of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720, 732 (S.D. Iil. 1989); Familystyle of
St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul, 728 F. Supp. 1396, 1401 (D. Minn. 1990), affd, 923 F.2d 91 (8th Cir.
1991); Cason v. Roche;ter Hous. Auth., 748 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (W.D.N.Y. 1990); Association of
Relatives & Friends of AIDS Patients (AFAPS) v. Regulations & Permits Admin., 740 F. Supp. 95, 103
(D.P.R. 1990).
92. Arlington Heights I, 429 U.S. at 265-66.
93. Id.
94. Arlington Heights 11. 558 F.2d at 1290.
95. McKinney, 790 F. Supp. at 1208.
96. Id. at 1213.
97. Id. at 1219.




inconsistent zoning was insufficient to outweigh the harm to the Foundation and its
tenants. 99
A. The Arlington Test, Part One - Discriminatory Intent
The McKinney court, applying the discriminatory intent analysis, found the
Commission's actions were discriminatory for several reasons. First, discriminatory
intent involves different treatment of similarly situated persons or groups." The
McKinney court determined that the HIV status of the prospective residents was at
least a partial motivating factor in the Commission's decision to require a special
permit.'' McKinney specifically held that choosing to focus on the legal concept
of intent, without considering the motivation of the individuals, was inappropri-
ate. For the Foundation to prevail on this point, they were not required to show
the Commission was motivated by some purposeful, malicious desire to discriminate
against HIV-infected persons." Nor must the Foundation prove that the Commis-
sion was motivated solely, primarily, or even predominately by the HIV-infected
status of the Foundation's future tenants. 04
Rather, the Foundation need only show that the HIV-positive status of the people
who were to live in the Fairfield property was a motivating factor in the Commis-
sion's decision to require the special permit."3 The McKinney opinion noted that
discriminatory intent does not necessarily depend on an open statement by a public
official of an intent to discriminate."'6 Discriminatory intent may be gleaned
through circumstantial evidence.0 7 The facts illustrate that when the Foundation's
plans to rent property to HIV-infected persons became generally known, it was met
with organized, widespread, and effective opposition. The court concluded that the
Commission, at the very least, bowed to the political pressure exerted by the
residents of Fairfield. 08
Second, the McKinney court determined there were uncharacteristic departures
from normal procedural sequences which further demonstrated discriminatory
intent."° Namely, the Commission's letter concerning the nature of the home's
occupants requested information irrelevant to zoning concerns."0 The letter
requested the Foundation to provide a "full picture of the manner in which the
99. Id. at 1222.
100. Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 933 (2d Cir.), affid, 488
U.S. 15 (1988).
101. McKinney, 790 F. $upp. at 1211.





106. Id. at 1212 (citing AFAPS, 740 F. Supp. at 103, 104).
107. Id. at 1212 (citing Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037, 1039 (10th Cir. 1970)) (addressing
the issue in the context of equal protection).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1213.
110. Id.
1993]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1993
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
property is to be used" because of "the uniqueness of the situation."'.. This
request, the court held, was not consistent with the Fair Housing Act, no matter
how "unique" the handicap."' In addition, the requirement that the Foundation
obtain a special exemption for its proposed use of the property was considered a
departure from normal substantive criteria."'
The McKinney holding emphatically rejects the Commission's argument that the
Foundation's use of the property was analogous to a chronic and convalescent
nursing home and that it was a charitable institution."4 The Foundation proved
the Commission was not only wrong, but that the decision was so arbitrary that
it likely resulted from an intent to discriminate. " '
Zoning regulations define a family as "including a group of not more than five
unrelated persons ... who live together as a single housekeeping unit maintaining
a common household."".6 The Commission's description of prospective tenants'
use of the Foundation's property as a chronic and convalescent nursing home and
a charitable institution was unreasonable."' Therefore, the Foundation's
proposed use of the property, as a family use, was permitted according to part one
of the Arlington test."'
B. Arlington Test, Part Two - Disparate Impact
The McKinney court, in applying the disparate impact test, held that the
Foundation sufficiently demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimination."9 To
establish a prima facie case, the Foundation need not show that the action
resulting in discrimination was motivated by a desire to discriminate against the
handicapped." More importantly, it is the effect and not the motivation which
is the touchstone. ' In Arlington Heights, the Seventh Circuit established a list
of factors to consider when evaluating facially neutral conduct that produces a
discriminatory effect.' " The four factors are:
(1) how strong is the plaintiffs showing of discriminatory effect; (2)
is there some evidence of discriminatory intent; (3) what is the
defendant's interest in taking the action complained of; and (4) does





115. Id.; see also Lieberman v. Grant, 630 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1980).
116. McKinney, 790 F. Supp. at 1213.
117. Id.; see also Oliver v. Zoning Comm'n, 326 A.2d 841 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1974).
118. McKinney, 790 F. Supp. at 1216.
119. Id. at 1220.
120. Id. at 1216; see also United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir.
1974).
121. Id.
122. See MetropoLtan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th




housing for members of a protected class or merely seeks to restrain
the defendant from interfering with individual property owners
wishing to provide such housing."
With respect to the discriminatory effect determination, McKinney clearly held
the Commission's actions adversely affected the Foundation's prospective tenants
because they are HIV-positive, a protected class under the Fair Housing Act."u
Moreover, the burdens imposed on the noninfected individuals living in the
community was negligible by comparison."z The court noted that all AIDS
patients in that community, without the availability of the hospice, were being
denied a place to live."6 Therefore, "all plaintiffs have been adversely impacted
each day the residence remains unopened," providing strong evidence of
discriminatory effect."z
In satisfying the second and third factors, the court found the neighbors'
discriminatory attitude and prejudices against AIDS patients contributed to the
commission's request for a special exception permit." The McKinney court held
that there were less discriminatory alternatives available to address the town's
concerns.
29
For example, if the Commission was genuinely interested in ensuring
uniformity in zoning, it could have used its police powers to investigate and
protect the welfare of the citizens." At the very least, the Commission should
have presented substantial evidence as to why the presence of the Foundation's
house would impair significant interests within the community.' Under the
disparate impact analysis, a defendant is required to prove that its action "furthers
a legitimate, bona fide governmental interest and that no alternative would serve
that interest with less discriminatory effect."'3 Accordingly, without an
additional showing of how the goals of the Commission were adversely affected
by the Foundation's presence, the claim concerning inconsistent zoning must fail.
The final factor of part two of the Arlington Heights test focuses on the nature
of the relief the Foundation sought. The Foundation attempted to enjoin the
Commission from imposing requirements that would have the effect of preventing
it from providing housing.' The Foundati6n did not seek to compel the City
123. Id.
124. McKinney, 790 F. Supp. at 1218.
125. Id.; see also Baxter, 720 F. Supp. at 732.
126. Id.
127. Id.; see also Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934 (2d Cir.),
affd, 488 U.S. 15 (1988).
128. McKinney, 790 F. Supp. at 1220.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id; see also Association of Relatives & Friends of AIDS Patients (AFAPS) v. Regulations &
Permits Admin., 740 F. Supp. 95 (D.P.R. 1990); cf. Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of
Huntington,844 F.2d 926, 939-40 (2d Cir.), affld, 488 U.S. 15 (1988).
132. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 844 F.2d at 936.
133. McKinney, 790 F. Supp. at 1221.
1993]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1993
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
to build public housing for HIV-positive persons." Under part two of the
Arlington Heights analysis, the McKinney court concluded that the Commission's
requirement that the Foundation apply for a special exception for its property had
a discriminatory effect on people with HIV.3' Consequently, this requirement
interfered with the Foundation's rights under the Fair Housing Act.
3 6
C. Outlook for the Future
While the fight to end zoning discrimination continues, one must not lose sight
of the battles being fought in virtually every community in America. Twenty
years after the passage of the Fair Housing Act, discrimination and segregation
in housing continue to be pervasive. HUD estimates that two million instances of
housing discrimination occur each year.3 ' Once the discriminatory violation has
been established, a decision must be made concerning enforcement of the law and
the type of remedial relief desired.'
Solely because a judge in a court of law in some city or state renders a
decision in one particular case does not mystically rid every community of
discriminatory practices. Some state and local municipalities have enacted
legislation which explicitly bans discrimination on the basis of HIV-related
infection.'39 Other HIV-specific laws contain a limitation excluding persons with
a contagious infection which would "constitute a direct threat to the health and
safety of other individuals."'" Most housing discrimination laws empower a
court to "use any available remedy to make good the wrong done" by housing
discrimination. 4' Therefore, relief provided by the courts is generally "prohibi-
tive and affirmative."
The prohibitive portion should forbid the defendant from disobeying the
law. 4" Typically these provisions alone fail to preclude repeated acts. 43 In
1974, the Seventh Circuit established a plaintiffs right to damages for emotional
distress under the Fair Housing Act.'" "Actual damages" were appropriate for
"the humiliation caused [which] can be inferred from the circumstances as well
as established by testimony.""'5 Recently, two HIV-related cases were settled for
134. Id.; see also Baxter, 720 F. Supp. at 733.
135. McKinney, 7S0 F. Supp. at 1219.
136. L. at 1221; c Baxter, 720 F. Supp. at 733.
137. See H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 25, at 15, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2176 (citing
U.S. COMM'N CIVIL RIGHTS, ISSUES IN HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 107 (1989) (testimony of John 3.
Knapp, General Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev.)).
138. Neil C. Bruce, Comment, Real Estate Steering and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 12 TULSA
L.J. 758, 768 (1977).
139. See supra note 88.
140. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.665 (Vernon Supp. 1990); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. §
760.50(3)(c) (West Supp. 1990).
141. See Moore v. Townsend, 525 F.2d 482, 485 (7th Cir. 1975).
142. See AIDS PACICE MANUAL, supra note 1, at 12-17.
143. Id.
144. See Seaton v. Sky Realty Co. 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974).




$182,500 and $150,000.'" Similarly, a number of Fair Housing cases have
returned damage awards of $20,000 or more. 47 Surprisingly the courts have had
little -difficulty determining an appropriate award for such injury.48
In Baxter, after the city's unwillingness to grant a permit for a home for HIV-
infected persons, the defendants were ordered to pay $29,000 to each plaintiff and
to pay approximately $60,000 to plaintiffs' attorneys for their fees and costs. 49
However, legislation with "teeth" is needed to provide plaintiffs with compensato-
ry and punitive damages to further deter repeated acts of discrimination.
VL Introduction to the Proposed Model Statute
The future of eradicating zoning discrimination requires a national commitment
to protect those who are subjected to HIV-related discrimination. Harsher
penalties must be administered to deter patterned abuse of the system. As of April
1992, only ten states and/or municipalities have adopted laws explicitly banning
housing discrimination on the basis of HIV infection or AIDS."S A more
aggressive approach is needed.
The Model Statute proposed in this comment identifies two problem areas
which have been continually ignored by state legislatures in their quest to provide
adequate protection for HIV-infected persons. First, in order to provide basic
protection for HIV-infected persons, the Model Statute specifically includes HIV-
infected persons in the definition of handicap.
Second, the Model Statute provides for the protection of group homes. That is,
the Model Statute specifically addresses group homes for the care of HIV-infected
persons in areas zoned for that purpose.
Trans World Airlines, 660 F.2d 1267, 1272 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that damages are recoverable for
emotional harm presumed from infringement of substantive constitutional rights); Chauffeurs, Teamsters
& Helpers, Local Union No. 238 v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 394 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1986) (stating
that emotional distress damages may be awarded under Iowa law).
146. See Lesbian and Gay Bar Ass'n of Chicago Newsletter, July 1989, at 11 (discussing Seitzman
v. Hudson River Assoc., 542 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1989)); Cole v. Naz Maghzi, No. 887962 (San Francisco,
Cal., Super. Ct.) (settlement of July 9, 1988).
147. See, e.g., Phillips v. Hunter Trails Community Ass'n, 685 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1982) (reducing
award of $52,675 in compensatory damages to $22,675); Davis v. Mansards, 597 F. Supp. 334 (N.D. Ind.
1984) ($10,000 awarded to each of two plaintiffs); Shaw v. Cassar, 558 F. Supp. 303, 315 (E.D. Mich.
1983) ($20,000 awarded); Grayson v. Rotundi, No. CV 83-0844 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 1984) (upholding jury
award of $40,000 to one plaintiff and $25,000 to another); Sutton v. Bloom, No. C 76-767 (N.D. Ohio
1978), reported in Robert G. Schwemm, Outline of Law Relating to Discrimination in Housing, 1 EQUAL
Opp. Hous. (P-H) 2353.1 (1979) ($63,100 awarded).
148. See Shaw, 558 F. Supp. at 315.
149. Baxter v. City of Belleville, No. 89-3354 (S.D. II1. Dec. 15, 1989) (order entering partial
consent decree). Attorneys' fees and costs were resolved by a subsequent agreement.
150. Id. See supra note 101.
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VII. Proposed Model Statute
Civil Rights: Discrimination in the Treatment of HIV-Infected Persons
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
It is the purpose of this Statute to prohibit housing and zoning discrimination on
the basis of acquired immune deficiency syndrome, acquired immune deficiency
syndrome related complex, and human immunodeficiency virus.
Section A. Definitions:
1. "People with handicaps" means a natural person having a physical impairment
which substantially limits one or more of a major life activity of such person,
including the condition of a person with a positive human immunodeficiency virus
test result, a diagnosis of acquired immune deficiency syndrome, a diagnosis of
acquired immune deficiency syndrome-related complex, or any other condition
related to acquired immune deficiency syndrome. The inclusion of a condition
related to a positive human immunodeficiency virus test result in the meaning of
"handicap" under the provisions of this chapter does not preclude the application of
the provisions of this chapter to conditions resulting from other contagious or
infectious diseases.15'
2. "Discriminatiorn in housing" means any unfair treatment of persons as it relates
to individual housing or group homes based on acquired immune deficiency
syndrome, acquired immune deficiency syndrome related complex, or human
immunodeficiency virus. This subsection also applies to persons who are not
currently infected with HIV but who are nevertheless denied housing on the belief
that they are infected with the HIV virus.
3. "Unlawful Discriminatory Practice" means any act that is unlawful under this
statute.
4."Group Home" means any residential health care facility, nursing home,
hospice, or any provider of long-term housing and shelter.
Section B. In General:
1. The Legislature finds and declares that persons infected or believed to be
infected with human immunodeficiency virus have suffered and will continue to
suffer irrational and scientifically unfounded discrimination. The Legislature further
finds and declares that society itself is harmed by this discrimination, as otherwise
able-bodied persons are deprived of the means of supporting themselves, providing
for their own health care, housing themselves, living together in group homes, and
participating in the opportunities otherwise available to them in society. The
Legislature further finds and declares that remedies are needed to correct these
problems.
2. Any person with or perceived as having acquired immune deficiency
syndrome, acquired immune deficiency syndrome related complex, or human
151. Sections (A)-(D) of the proposed model statute derive a majority of their information from Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 191.665, 213.010 (Vernon Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.50 (West Supp. 1990);




immunodeficiency virus shall have every protection made available to handicapped
persons.
3. No person, agency, organization, or corporate body may discriminate against
a person on the basis of a positive acquired immune deficiency syndrome test result,
or perception of same, in individual housing, group homes, or delivery of services,
not shall an acquired immune deficiency syndrome test be required as a condition
of being granted housing, except where nondiscrimination can be shown, on the
testimony of competent medical authorities, to constitute a clear and present danger
of AIDS virus transmission to others.
4. It is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, directly or indirectly,
to refuse, withhold from or deny any other person, or to attempt to refuse, withhold
from or deny any other person, any of the advantages, facilities, services, or
privileges made available in public housing, group homes, or to segregate or
discriminate against any such person in the use thereof on the grounds of immune
deficiency syndrome, acquired immune deficiency syndrome related complex, or
human immunodeficiency virus.
Section C. Burden of Proof:
1. A person may not discriminate against an otherwise qualified individual in
individual housing or group homes on the basis of the fact that such individual is,
or is regarded as being, infected with human immunodeficiency virus.
2. A person or other entity receiving or benefiting from state financial assistance
for public housing may not discriminate against an otherwise qualified individual
on the basis of the fact that such individual is, or is regarded as being, infected with
human immunodeficiency virus.
3. A person who discriminates in individual housing or group homes against an
individual who is infected with human immunodeficiency virus shall have the
burden of proving that no reasonable accommodation can be made to prevent the
likelihood that the individual will, under the circumstances involved, expose other
individuals to a significant possibility of being infected with human immunodefi-
ciency virus.
4. Exceptions to anti-discrimination laws in individual housing, group homes, and
zoning will be strictly construed and certain exceptions will be allowed under very
limited circumstances. 152
(a) a private, single family homeowner renting or selling his or her own home
will be exempt under the Fair Housing Act."
(b) owner-occupied dwellings with no more than four living units."
Section D. Remedies:
1. Any person aggrieved by a violation of this section shall have a right of action
in the circuit court and may recover for each violation:
2. Against any person who violates a provision of this section, liquidated damages
of $1,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater.
152. See United States v. Hughes Mem. Home, 396 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Va. 1975).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1) (1988).
154. Id. § 3603(b)(2).
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3. Against any person who intentionally or recklessly violates a provision of this
section, liquidated damages of $5,000 or actual damages, whichever is greater.
4. Against any person for willful and wanton conduct, punitive damages shall be
awarded according to the discretion of the court.
5. Reasonable attorney's fees.
6. Such other relief, including an injunction, as the court may deem appropriate.
7. Nothing in this section limits the right of the person aggrieved by a violation
of this section to recover damages or other relief under any other applicable law.
VIII. Commentary to the Proposed Model Statute
A. Title
The title chosen for the Model Statute, "Discrimination in the Treatment of HIV-
Infected Persons," reflects the frustration associated with having a virus which
requires special legislation to educate those who have not fallen prey to this fatal
disease. There are two essential aspects of this disease that cause discrimination.
First, most of the IV-infected individuals are associated with socially ostracized
groups.'55 Although the virus transcends all economic, social, and cultural
boundaries, persons diagnosed with the virus are suspected of "unacceptable"
lifestyles and discriminated against on that basis."
Second, hysteria surrounding the fear of being infected with the fatal and
incurable disease leads to inexcusable discrimination. '" This hysteria perpetuates
fear and prevents the presence of infected persons in certain communities. Thus, the
HIV epidemic and its discriminatory effects involve not only complex medical and
legal issues, but interrelated moral issues regarding what is an "acceptable"
lifestyle.' Educating the public about the realities of the disease and the effects
of this discrimination is necessary.
B. Section A: Definitions
Section A defines five terms which are central to the application of this Statute.
Subsection 1 defines "People with Handicaps" broadly, adopting AIDS, AIDS-
related complexes and HIV specific language. By employing this broad definition,
the Model Statute makes clear that persons infected with HIV or any AIDS-related
complexes, regardless of where the virus was contracted, will be considered
155. See Robert P. Wasson, Jr., AIDS Discrimination Under Federal, State, and Local Law After
Arline, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 221, 230 (1987).
156. Id.; see, e.g., Robert J. Blendon & Karen Donelan, Discrimination Against People with AIDS:
The Public's Perspective, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1022, 1023-24 (1988) (describing a Harvard University
study which found that 20% of the people surveyed believed that AIDS-infected individuals were "getting
their rightful due").





handicapped despite their citizenship status or nationality." 9 Once it is shown that
a person is infected with HIV, there should be no necessity for further inquiry into
whether the person is substantially limited in a major life activity or is regarded as
being so limited.'6"
Subsection 2 defines "Discrimination" in a manner intended to make clear that
it is both broad and narrow in scope. On the one hand, it is narrow enough to cover
specific incidents of unfair treatment of persons with AIDS, AIDS Related Complex
(ARC), or HIV. On the other hand, it is broad enough to include persons who are
not infected with HIV but who are nevertheless treated as having HIV by a
discriminating individual. Since the person is regarded as having an impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity, the individual is therefore considered
handicapped. For example, an employee who is rumored to be infected with HIV
even though the rumor is totally unfounded may be subjected to discrimination. The
person who perceives the individual as being handicapped and fires him is
discriminating on the basis of handicap.'
Subsection 3 defines "Unlawful Discriminatory Practice" to include all incidents
of discrimination in individual housing and group homes related to AIDS, ARC, or
IV.
Subsection 5 defines "Group Homes" to encompass any licensed residential health
care provider and does not limit the term to nursing homes or hospices. There shall
be no set limit on the number of occupants receiving care. The number of
occupants should be a reasonable amount determined by the licensed health care
provider and its staff.
Consideration should be given to the severity of the disease in question. A
landlord or property owner resisting the group's occupancy must establish that there
is a nexus between the individual's tenancy that would constitute a direct threat to
the health and safety of other individuals.62
The perceived threat of economic loss to a landlord or property owner from
renting, leasing, or selling to people with IV does not constitute a direct threat.
The landlord's conduct is linked with the handicap of potential tenants and therefore
his conduct amounts to unlawful discriminatory intent.'0 The direct threat
provision does not allow landlords or property owners to ask probing questions
concerning the individual's handicap." 4 A landlord or property owner may only
inquire into the person's ability to meet requirements for tenancy or property
159. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,740 (1991).
160. Similar to Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 (1993).
161. See generally 56 Fed. Reg. 35,742 (1991) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.2(1) (1993)).
162. See H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 25, at 29, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2190.
163. See, e.g., United States v. Real Estate One, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 1140, 1156 (E.D. Mich. 1977)
(holding that real estate company cannot discriminate in order to avoid offending customers); United
States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438, 443 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that real estate company cannot
discriminate against blacks to avoid losing other business), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
164. See H.R. REP. No. 711, supra note 25, at 30, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2191.
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purchase,"r and may not ask questions which require the individual to waive his
or her right of confidentiality concerning his or her medical condition.'"
C. Section B: In General
This section sets forth specific rules concerning the treatment of people with
AIDS, ARC, or HIV. The rules vest in the HIV-infected person every protection
made available to handicapped persons.
D. Section C: Burden of Proof
Section C identifies two problem areas when dealing with unlawful discrimina-
tion, including allocating the burden of proof. In the area of housing discrimination,
an "intent" analysis or an "effects" analysis can be used to establish discrimination.
With an intent analysis, the HIV-positive individual merely shows that his handicap
played "some part" or was a "consideration" in the challenged discriminatory
conduct. 67 The landlord or property owner's financial concerns are irrelevant in
meeting his burden of proof.
Under the effects analysis, discrimination is shown without proof of discriminato-
ry intent, as long as the challenged action has a disproportionate impact on the
handicapped." s Once established, the burden shifts to the defendant to justify his
conduct. If the defendant is a private entity, it must show a "compelling business
justification" for its conduct.'" If the defendant is a government entity, its actions
must be necessary to promote a compelling government purpose.
70
E. Section D: Remedies
Remedies that are available for unlawful discrimination against HIV-infected
persons should be both broad and specific. On one hand the defendant should be
prohibited from engaging in any known discriminatory activity for which liability
has been imputed. Courts should order affirmative relief when prohibitions alone
may be ineffective:. The affirmative measures may include judicial monitoring of
compliance through education, advertising, or record keeping.'
7'
Other remedies available include injunctions which should be used to insure that
no future violations occur and to recover any lingering effects of past discrimina-
165. See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. H4613 (daily ed. June 22. 1988) (statement of Rep. Schroeder). 134
CONG. REC. H4922 (daily ed. June 29, 1988) (statement of Rep. Waxman). Landlord could not ask about
HIV test results, or require a prospective tenant to take an HIV test.
166. Id.
167. See Baxter v. City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720, 732 (S.D. 111. 1989); Association of
Relatives & Friends of AIDS Patients (AFAPS) v. Regulations & Permits Admin., 740 F. Supp. 95, 106-
07 (D.P.R. 1990).
168. See AIDS PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 1, at 12-15.
169. Id.
170. See Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926,934-37 (2d Cir.), af'd,
488 U.S. 15 (1988); Betsy v. Turtle Creek Assoc., 736 F.2d 983, 986 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v.
City of Black Jack, 501, F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).





tion.'7 : Compensatory damages may be awarded for emotional suffering and
humiliation, which can be inferred from the circumstances or by testimony."
Punitive damages may be justified if it is clear that the defendant's conduct rose to
the level of malevolence or wantonness. 4 Attorney fee awards may be granted




HIV and AIDS elicit a wide range of public reactions. Some people respond with
fear while other people seek to become more informed. As the court in AFAPS
observed:
No one will deny that the AIDS epidemic ... has generated great cause
for concern. No one can blame the residents of any town for making a
priority of the health and safety of their families and community. But
when legitimate concern is fanned by a profound misunderstanding of
the causes of AIDS, the rush to panic can easily result in illegal and
unjustifiable discrimination against not only the disease's victims but
also against the laudable efforts of individuals working to contain the
flames."76
The McKinney opinion echoes these sentiments and attempts to conclusively allay
the fears people have of a disease they do not understand. The message being
communicated involves changing society's attitude toward the continued mistreat-
ment of people with HIV-related infections.
History dramatically illustrates a pattern of discrimination. In the past, society
thought it was justified in imposing barriers on people of color. The mentally
retarded were herded like animals and housed under abominable conditions and
locations. These incidents of invidious discrimination are not new. They continue
to arise in communities throughout the United States.
Zoning discrimination against people with HIV is just the "newest" form of
discrimination, slowly emerging as a result of public prejudice. The Fair Housing
Amendment Act in 1988 provided the first positive step to recognize persons with
HIV-related infections as having handicaps. This first step will facilitate their
eventual inclusion into the American mainstream. The challenge to the legal
community is to propose and seek enactment of specific legislation that recognizes
172. Id. at 83; see also Marable v. Walder, 704 F.2d 1219, 1221 (1lth Cir. 1983).
173. See Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634, 636 (7th Cir. 1974); accord Gore v. Turner, 563
F.2d 159, 164 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Williams v. TWA, 660 F.2d 1267, 1272 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding
that damages for emotional harm presumed from infringement of substantive constitutional rights).
174. See Crumble v. Blumthal, 549 F.2d 462 (7th Cir. 1977).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (1988); see also Baxter v. City of Belleville, 720 F. Supp. 720 (S.D.
II. 1989) (order entering partial consent decree). Attorneys' fees and costs were resolved by a subsequent
agreement.
176. AFAPS, 740 F. Supp. at 107.
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lIlV as a handicap for people who cannot escape its deadly grasp. The challenge
to everyone is to strive to enforce what Congress has mandated by strengthening
AIDS legislation through litigation and education, while avoiding the sins of past
discrimination.
Patrick F. Summers
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